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If you refer to yourself in the third person for a day how does your understanding of self change? For example are you more inclined to consider your actions and motivations from and external perspective and perhaps question them more deeply? Or perhaps, does an exercise like this lead to detachment from self and perhaps some form of depersonalization? And is there any research in this area?
One way to think about this is called "self-distancing" (e.g., Kross & Ayduk, 2011), which has primarily been studied in terms of emotion regulation. Self-distancing is when you view your experiences from a third-person perspective. This is generally considered to be an adaptive form of self-reflection (as opposed to rumination, which is generally considered to be maladaptive). However, as a rule, most things are neither purely adaptive or maladaptive.
Self-distancing is a relatively potent strategy for dampening negative emotions (Webb, Miles & Sheeran, 2012) and is associated with reduced cardiovascular reactivity to negative experiences (Ayduk & Kross, 2008). It's also associated with a reduction in intrusive thoughts and more problem-solving behavior (Ayduk & Kross, 2010).
If you're interested in learning more about this, look up Ozlem Ayduk and Ethan Kross.
Talking to yourself in the third person can help you control emotions
The simple act of silently talking to yourself in the third person during stressful times may help you control emotions without any additional mental effort than what you would use for first-person self-talk -- the way people normally talk to themselves.
A first-of-its-kind study led by psychology researchers at Michigan State University and the University of Michigan indicates that such third-person self-talk may constitute a relatively effortless form of self-control. The findings are published online in Scientific Reports, a Nature journal.
Say a man named John is upset about recently being dumped. By simply reflecting on his feelings in the third person ("Why is John upset?"), John is less emotionally reactive than when he addresses himself in the first person ("Why am I upset?").
"Essentially, we think referring to yourself in the third person leads people to think about themselves more similar to how they think about others, and you can see evidence for this in the brain," said Jason Moser, MSU associate professor of psychology. "That helps people gain a tiny bit of psychological distance from their experiences, which can often be useful for regulating emotions."
The study, partially funded by the National Institutes of Health and the John Temple Foundation, involved two experiments that both significantly reinforced this main conclusion.
In one experiment, at Moser's Clinical Psychophysiology Lab, participants viewed neutral and disturbing images and reacted to the images in both the first and third person while their brain activity was monitored by an electroencephalograph. When reacting to the disturbing photos (such as a man holding a gun to their heads), participants' emotional brain activity decreased very quickly (within 1 second) when they referred to themselves in the third person.
The MSU researchers also measured participants' effort-related brain activity and found that using the third person was no more effortful than using first person self-talk. This bodes well for using third-person self-talk as an on-the-spot strategy for regulating one's emotions, Moser said, as many other forms of emotion regulation require considerable thought and effort.
In the other experiment, led by U-M psychology professor Ethan Kross, who directs the Emotion and Self-Control Lab, participants reflected on painful experiences from their past using first and third person language while their brain activity was measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging, or FMRI.
Similar to the MSU study, participants displayed less activity in a brain region that is commonly implicated in reflecting on painful emotional experiences when using third person self-talk, suggesting better emotional regulation. Further, third person self-talk required no more effort-related brain activity than using first person.
"What's really exciting here," Kross said, "is that the brain data from these two complimentary experiments suggest that third-person self-talk may constitute a relatively effortless form of emotion regulation.
"If this ends up being true -- we won't know until more research is done -- there are lots of important implications these findings have for our basic understanding of how self-control works, and for how to help people control their emotions in daily life."
Moser and Kross said their teams are continuing to collaborate to explore how third-person self-talk compares to other emotion-regulation strategies.
We all have an internal monologue that we engage in from time to time an inner voice that guides our moment-to-moment reflections 1,2,3 . Although people frequently engage in such “self-talk”, recent findings indicate that the language they use to refer to the self when they engage in this process influences self-control. Specifically, using one’s own name to refer to the self during introspection, rather than the first-person pronoun “I”, increases peoples’ ability to control their thoughts, feelings, and behavior under stress 4,5,6 .
But just how easy is it for people to control their emotions via third-person self-talk ? Emotion regulation, as with many forms of self-control, is typically thought of as an effortful process e.g. 7 , that depends heavily on cognitive control mechanisms to muffle emotional responses 8,9,10 . Might third-person self-talk constitute a relatively effortless form of emotional control that does not require additional cognitive control processes above and beyond those recruited when people typically reflect on negative experiences? Here we suggest that it does.
This prediction is motivated by the observation that people almost exclusively use names to refer to other people. Thus, there is a tight coupling between using proper names, and thinking about others—a coupling that is so tight that we expected using one’s own name to refer to the self would virtually automatically lead people to think about the self similarly to how they think about someone else. If this prediction is correct, and if it is indeed easier for people to reason calmly about other people’s emotions than their own 4, 5 , then third-person self-talk should be linked with reductions in emotional reactivity but not enhancements in cognitive control.
We tested these predictions by asking participants to reflect on their feelings associated with viewing aversive images from the International Affective Picture System (Study 1) and recalling painful autobiographical memories (Study 2) using either “I” or their name while measuring neural activity via event-related brain potentials (ERPs Study 1) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI Study 2).
In Study 1, we measured ERPs while participants viewed standardized images depicting arousing negative and neutral scenes under two conditions. In the First-Person condition, participants asked themselves “…what am [I] feeling right now? ” in the Third-Person condition, they asked themselves, “…what is [Participants’ Name] feeling right now” (Fig. 1, top panel). ERPs have been extensively used to identify the neural mechanisms supporting people’s ability to control emotional responses. This work consistently reveals two waveforms that are involved in emotion regulation: the late positive potential (LPP) and the stimulus preceding negativity (SPN). The LPP is a robust marker of emotional reactivity 9, 11 . It is enlarged to negative and positive stimuli relative to neutral stimuli, especially when such stimuli are self-relevant 12 , and is closely coupled with subjective ratings and physiological markers of arousal 11, 13 . The frontally distributed SPN, on the other hand, indexes cognitive control processes 9, 14 . Importantly, an extensive body of research indicates that the LPP is attenuated and the SPN amplified during the implementation of effortful emotion regulation strategies such as cognitive reappraisal 15,16,17 . Thus, our analyses focused on these waveforms. Based on our theoretical framework, we predicted that third-person self-talk would lead to reductions of the LPP elicited by aversive images but no change in the SPN.
Visual depiction of trial structures in Study 1 (top) & Study 2 (bottom). In Study 1, participants first viewed a linguistic cue (“First-Person” or “Third-Person”) for 2 s that directed them to either use I or their own name when thinking about the following picture. Next, a blank screen was presented for 500 ms followed by a white fixation cross lasting 500 ms. Following the fixation cross, an IAPS image was displayed for 6 s. A blank screen then appeared for 2.5 s. In Study 2, each trial began with a 2 s fixation cross. Subsequently, participants saw a linguistic cue for 2 s (“I” or their own name). Next, they saw another fixation cross for 4 s. A memory cue-phrase then appeared on the center of the screen for 15 s, signaling participants to reflect on an autobiographical experience they had generated previously. The same linguistic cue that participants saw at the beginning of the trial appeared beneath the memory cue to ensure that participants continued to reflect on the memory using the appropriate part of speech. Finally, participants had 3 s to rate how they felt using a five-point scale (1 = not at all negative 5 = very negative).
In Study 2, we extended our ERP study in two ways. First, while the standardized images used in Study 1 are useful for studying emotion under tightly controlled conditions, many of the situations that require self-control in daily life are elicited by thinking about idiosyncratic negative experiences. Thus, in Study 2 we used an autobiographical memory paradigm to elicit negative emotion to examine how third-person self-talk operates in a more ecologically valid context (see Fig. 1, bottom panel).
Second, whereas the ERPs used in Study 1 provide information about the temporal dimensions of self-referential emotional processing and cognitive control, they do not provide detailed information about the specific brain structures involved. Therefore, in Study 2 we used fMRI to test whether third-person self-talk would reduce activations in a priori identified brain regions that are commonly implicated in thinking about the self versus others (e.g., medial prefrontal cortex 18 ) and emotional reactivity (i.e., the amygdala 8 ) without increasing activation in fronto-parietal regions that support cognitive control 8 .
Using both of these neuroimaging methods allowed us to pursue converging evidence for our hypothesis across the temporal and spatial dimensions of self-referential emotional processing and cognitive control. Employing two different emotion elicitation paradigms further allowed us to evaluate whether our hypothesized effects of third-person self-talk would generalize across relatively more standardized versus ideographic stimuli. Together, these two experiments provide a multi-method test of our hypothesis regarding third-person self-talk as a relatively effortless form of self-control.
As seen by the other. Perspectives on the self in the memories and emotional perceptions of Easterners and Westerners
The experiment reported investigated the phenomenological consequences of Easterners' and Westerners'perspectives on the self Two findings are consistent with the notion that Asians are more likely than Westerners to experience the self from the perspective of the generalized other First, Eastern participants were more likely than Western participants to have third-person (as opposed to first-person) memories when they thought about situations in which they would be at the center of a scene. Second, Easterners and Westerners engaged in different sorts of projections when they read the emotional expressions of other people. Westerners were more biased than Easterners toward egocentric projection of their own emotions onto others, whereas Easterners were more biased than Westerners toward relational projection, in which they projected onto others the emotions that the generalized other would feel in relation to the participant. Implications for how phenomenological experiences could reinforce different Eastern and Western ideologies about the self and the group are discussed.
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Responses to all measures were analyzed using a 2 (source status: majority vs. minority) × 2 (message quality: strong vs. weak) between-subjects factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA). There were no significant effects involving gender or age so these variables are not considered in subsequent analyses. The means and standard deviations of the dependent measures are shown in Table 1 .
Means and standard deviations for all dependent measures as a function of source status and argument quality (Experiment 1).
|Measure||Strong (n = 22)||Weak (n = 19)||Strong (n = 22)||Weak (n = 20)|
|Influence on self||3.95||3.73||4.64||3.05|
|Influence on others||5.00||4.57||4.86||4.55|
|Thinking on self||4.72||5.21||4.27||4.30|
|Thinking on others||5.09||4.36||4.45||4.40|
|Source status on self||2.68||3.42||3.13||3.30|
|Source status on others||5.01||5.10||4.50||4.20|
Source manipulation check. The analysis of participants’ estimates of the percentages of students against voluntary euthanasia revealed, as expected, a main effect of source status. It showed that those in the majority condition remembered that more students in the survey agreed with the message (M = 71.31) than did those in the minority condition (M = 43.14), F(1, 79) = 52.19, p < 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.34 (for a discussion on the informativeness and limitations of manipulation checks, see Fayant, Sigall, Lemonnier, Retsin & Alexopoulos, 2017 ).
Perception of Influence on Self and Others
To examine the perception of majority or minority influence, analyses focused on perceived influence on self and perceived influence on others separately. Also, as is often measured in the third-person effect literature, perceived influence was tested directly with a repeated measures analysis on self and others.
Separate analyses of perceived influence on self and others. The analysis revealed a main effect for argument quality, with strong arguments leading to greater perceived influence on self (M = 4.30, SD = 1.61) compared to the weak arguments (M = 3.41, SD = 1.70), F(1, 79) = 5.96, p < 0.02, ηp 2 = 0.07. The two-way interaction between source status and message quality was also significant F(1, 79) = 3.92, p < 0.05, ηp 2 = 0.05. Analysis of simple main effects showed that the strong message had greater influence than the weak message only in the minority condition, indicating greater elaboration, F(1, 40) = 7.86, p < 0.007, ηp 2 = 0.16. The difference between strong and weak arguments in the majority condition was not statistically significant, F < 1. These findings provide support for Hypothesis 2. No significant results were found concerning the perceived influence on others.
Comparative analyses of perceived influence on self versus others. The effects of source status and argument quality on the target of perceived influence (self, others) were examined with a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. As expected, results indicated a significant main effect for target, F(1, 79) = 23.87, p < 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.23. Participants perceived that the others would be more influenced (M = 4.76, SD = 1.33) than themselves (M = 3.88, SD = 1.70), providing support for the third-person effect (Hypothesis 1). The three-way interaction between target of influence, source status and argument quality also was significant, F(1, 79) = 4.40, p < 0.04, ηp 2 = 0.05. The differences were those observed in the perceived influence on self, presented earlier (that is, strong messages led to greater perceived influence in the minority condition only). These data suggest that participants in the minority condition believed that they would be less influenced by the weak (vs. strong) arguments. In other words, a more pronounced third-person effect was evident in the minority weak condition.
Perceived Reasons Accounting for Influence
To examine the reasons participants provide to explain the potential majority or minority influence, separate and comparative measures were tested. The former include thinking or source status as a cause of influence. The latter include three comparative indices, (a) thinking as a cause of influence on others minus on self, (b) source status as a cause of influence on others minus on self, and (c) source status as a cause of influence minus thinking (on self and on others).
Perception of thinking as a cause of influence. The analysis on the perception of thinking as a cause of influence on self revealed a main effect for source status with the majority leading to greater perceived influence of thinking (M = 5.00, SD = 1.52) compared to the minority (M = 4.29, SD = 1.72), F(1, 81) = 4.23, p < 0.05, ηp 2 = 0.05. Participants facing a majority (vs. a minority) suggested that thinking could be a possible reason of the potential influence on self, providing support for Hypothesis 4. No differences were found for the perception of thinking as a cause of influence on others. The difference between the two measures (perceived thinking on others minus perceived thinking on self, Pronin et al., 2007 ) was also tested but yielded no significant results.
Perception of source status as a cause of influence. The analyses on the perception of source status as a cause of influence revealed no differences for the potential influence on self, but a main effect for the potential influence on others, F(1, 81) = 7.08, p < 0.01, ηp 2 = 0.08. Majority (vs. minority) led to an increased perception of source status as a cause of influence (M = 5.07, SD = 1.12 vs. M = 4.36, SD = 1.35 for majority and minority conditions, respectively). Moreover, the difference between perception of social status as a cause of influence on others minus the perception of social status as a cause of influence on self also revealed a significant main effect of source. Majority (vs. minority) led to a greater difference, F(1, 81) = 4.71, p < 0.04, ηp 2 = 0.05, (M = 2.02 vs. M = 1.14 for majority and minority conditions, respectively). This result indicates that participants thought others would be more influenced by the status of the source when they were facing a counter-attitudinal majority rather than minority.
Differences in perceptions of thinking versus source status as causes of influence. To examine the difference in importance between the reasons perceived by the participants that may be responsible for the social influence on self, a 2 (majority vs. minority) × 2 (strong arguments vs. weak arguments) × 2 (perception of source status vs. perception of thinking) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was employed. As expected, a significant main effect for perception was, F(1, 81) = 50.42, p < 0.001, ηp 2 = 0.38. Participants indicated that perceived thinking was a more likely factor of influence compared to source status (M = 4.64, SD = 1.66 vs. 3.12, SD = 1.75 for perception of thinking and source status, respectively), providing support for Hypothesis 3. No significant results were found concerning perceived influence on others.
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Keywords: body representation, distance, gravity, auditory, crossmodal, tactile, self-perception
Citation: Harris LR, Carnevale MJ, D𠆚mour S, Fraser LE, Harrar V, Hoover AEN, Mander C and Pritchett LM (2015) How our body influences our perception of the world. Front. Psychol. 6:819. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00819
Received: 26 March 2015 Accepted: 29 May 2015
Published: 12 June 2015.
Achille Pasqualotto, Sabanci University, Turkey
Michiel M. Spapé, Helsinki Institute for Information Technology HIIT/Aalto University, Finland
Manuela Ruzzoli, Pompeu Fabra University, Spain
Copyright © 2015 Harris, Carnevale, D𠆚mour, Fraser, Harrar, Hoover, Mander and Pritchett. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Provocative dress as stimuli
In the 1980s researchers were interested in women’s provocative (revealing, sexy) dress and the extent to which men and women attributed the same meaning to it. For example, both Edmonds and Cahoon (1986) and Cahoon and Edmonds (1987) found ratings of women who wore provocative dress were more negative than ratings of women who wore non-provocative dress. No specific theory was identified by these authors as guiding their research. Overall, when wearing provocative dress a model was rated more sexually appealing, more attractive, less faithful in marriage, more likely to engage in sexual teasing, more likely to use sex for personal gain, more likely to be sexually experienced, and more likely to be raped than when wearing conservative dress. Cahoon and Edmonds found that men and women made similar judgments, although men’s were more extreme than women’s. Abbey et al. (1987) studied whether women’s sexual intent and interest as conveyed by revealing dress was misinterpreted by men. The authors developed two dress conditions: revealing (slit skirt, low cut blouse, high heeled shoes) and non-revealing (skirt without a slit, blouse buttoned to neck, boots). Participants rated the stimulus person on a series of adjective traits. As compared to when wearing the non-revealing clothing, when wearing the revealing clothing the stimulus person was rated significantly more flirtatious, sexy, seductive, promiscuous, sophisticated, assertive, and less sincere and considerate. This research was not guided by theory.
Taking this research another step forward, in the 1990s dress researchers began to investigate how women’s provocative (revealing, sexy) dress was implicated in attributions of responsibility for their own sexual assaults (Lewis & Johnson 1989 Workman & Freeburg 1999 Workman & Orr 1996) and sexual harassment (Johnson & Workman 1992, 1994 Workman & Johnson 1991). These researchers tended to use attribution theories (McLeod, 2010) to guide their research. Their results showed that provocative, skimpy, see-through, or short items of dress, as well as use of heavy makeup (body modification), were cues used to assign responsibility to women for their sexual assaults and experiences of sexual harassment. For example, Johnson and Workman (1992) studied likelihood of sexual harassment as a function of women’s provocative dress. A model was photographed wearing a dark suit jacket, above-the-knee skirt, a low-cut blouse, dark hose, and high heels (provocative condition) or wearing a dark suit jacket, below-the-knee skirt, high-cut blouse, neutral hose, and moderate heels (non-provocative condition). As compared to when wearing non-provocative dress, when wearing provocative dress the model was rated as significantly more likely to provoke sexual harassment and to be sexually harassed.
Recently, researchers have resurrected the topic of provocative (revealing, sexy) dress. However, their interest is in determining the extent to which women and girls are depicted in provocative dress in the media (in magazines, in online retail stores) and the potential consequences of those depictions, such as objectification. These researchers have often used objectification theory to guide their research. According to objectification theory (Fredrickson & Roberts 1997) women living in sexually saturated cultures are looked at, evaluated, and potentially objectified and treated as objects valued for their use by others. Objectification theory focuses on sexual objectification as a function of objectifying gaze, which is experienced in actual social encounters, media depictions of social encounters, and media depictions that focus on bodies and body parts. The theory explains that objectifying gaze evokes an objectified state of consciousness which influences self-perceptions. This objectified state of consciousness has consequences such as habitual body and appearance monitoring and requires cognitive effort that can result in difficulty with task performance (Szymanski et al. 2011). In such an environment, women may perceive their bodies from a third-person perspective, treating themselves as objects to be looked at and evaluated.
Self-objectification occurs when people perceive and describe their bodies as a function of appearance instead of accomplishments (Harrison & Fredrickson 2003). Experimental research shows that self-objectification in women can be induced by revealing clothing manipulations such as asking women to try on and evaluate the fit of a swimsuit as compared to a bulky sweater (Fredrickson et al. 1998).
To examine changes in sexualizing (provocative) characteristics with which girls are portrayed in the media, researchers have content analyzed girls’ clothing in two magazines (Graff et al. 2013). Clothing was coded as having sexualizing characteristics (e.g., tightness, bare midriffs, high-heeled shoes) and childlike characteristics (e.g., frills, childlike print, pigtail hair styles). The researchers found an increase in sexualized aspects of dress in depictions of girls from 1971 through 2011. To determine the extent of sexualization in girls’ clothing, researchers have content analyzed girls’ clothing available on 15 retailer websites (Goodin et al. 2011). Every girl’s clothing item on each of the retailer websites was coded for sexualizing aspects 4% was coded as definitely sexualizing. Ambiguously sexualizing clothing (25%) had both sexualizing and childlike characteristics. Abercrombie Kids’ clothing had a higher percentage of sexualizing characteristics than all the other stores (44% versus 4%). These two studies document that girls are increasingly depicted in sexualizing clothing in U.S. media and that they are offered sexualized clothing by major retailers via their websites.
Since girls are increasingly sexualized, to determine if sexualized dress affects how girls are perceived by others Graff et al. (2012) designed an experiment wherein they manipulated the sexualizing aspects of the clothing of a 5 th grade girl. There were three clothing conditions: childlike (a grey t-shirt, jeans, and black Mary Jane shoes), ambiguously sexualized (leopard print dress of moderate length), highly sexualized (short dress, leopard print cardigan, purse). In the definitely sexualized condition, undergraduate students rated the girl as less moral, self-respecting, capable, determined, competent, and intelligent than when she was depicted in either the childlike or the ambiguously sexualized conditions. Thus, wearing sexualized clothing can affect how girls are perceived by others, so it is possible that sexualized clothing could lead to self-objectification in girls just as in the case of women (Tiggemann & Andrew 2012).
Objectification theory has been useful in identifying probable processes underlying the association between women’s provocative dress and negative inferences. In a study using adult stimuli, Gurung and Chrouser (2007) presented photos of female Olympic athletes in uniform and in provocative (defined as minimal) dress. College women rated the photos and when provocatively dressed, as compared to the uniform condition, the women were rated as more attractive, more feminine, more sexually experienced, more desirable, but also less capable, less strong, less determined, less intelligent, and as having less self-respect. These results are similar to what had previously been found by researchers in the 1980s (Abbey et al. 1987 Cahoon & Edmonds 1987 Edmonds & Cahoon 1986). This outcome is considered objectifying because the overall impression is negative and sexist. Thus, this line of research does more than demonstrate that provocative dress evokes inferences, it suggests the process by which that occurs: provocative dress leads to objectification of the woman so dressed and it is the objectification that leads to the inferences.
In a more direct assessment of the relationship between provocative dress and objectification of others, Holland and Haslam (2013) manipulated the dress (provocative or plain clothing) of two models (thin or overweight) who were rated equally attractive in facial attractiveness. Since objectification involves inspecting the body, the authors measured participants’ attention to the models’ bodies. Objectification also involves denying human qualities to the objectified person. Two such qualities are perceived agency (e.g., ability to think and form intentions) and moral agency (e.g., capacity to engage in moral or immoral actions). Several findings are relevant to the research on provocative dress. As compared to models wearing plain clothing, models wearing provocative clothing were attributed less perceived agency (e.g., ability to reason, ability to choose) and less moral agency [e.g., “how intentional do you believe the woman’s behavior is?” (p. 463)]. Results showed that more objectified gaze was directed toward the bodies of the models when they were dressed in provocative clothing as compared to when dressed in plain clothing. This outcome is considered objectifying because the models’ bodies were inspected more when wearing provocative dress, and because in that condition they were perceived as having less of the qualities normally attributed to humans.
In an experimental study guided by objectification theory, Tiggemann and Andrew (2012) studied the effects of clothing on self-perceptions of state self-objectification, state body shame, state body dissatisfaction, and negative mood. However, unlike studies (e.g., Fredrickson et al. 1998) in which participants were asked to try on and evaluate either a bathing suit or a sweater, Tiggemann and Andrew instructed their participants to “imagine what you would be seeing, feeling, and thinking” (p. 648) in scenarios. There were four scenarios: thinking about wearing a bathing suit in public, thinking about wearing a bathing suit in a dressing room, thinking about wearing a sweater in public, and thinking about wearing a sweater in a dressing room. The researchers found main effects for clothing such that as compared to thinking about wearing a sweater, thinking about wearing a bathing suit resulted in higher state self-objectification, higher state body shame, higher state body dissatisfaction, and greater negative mood. The fact that the manipulation only involved thinking about wearing clothing, rather than actually wearing such clothing, demonstrates the power of revealing (provocative, sexy) dress in that we only have to think about wearing it to have it affect our self-perceptions.
Taking extant research into account we encourage researchers to continue to investigate the topic of provocative (sexy, revealing) dress for both men and women to replicate the results for women and to determine if revealing dress for men might evoke the kinds of inferences evoked by women wearing revealing dress. Furthermore, research that delineates the role of objectification in the process by which this association between dress and inferences occurs would be useful. Although it would not be ethical to use the experimental strategy used by previous researchers (Fredrickson et al. 1998) with children, it is possible that researchers could devise correlational studies to investigate the extent to which wearing and/or viewing sexualized clothing might lead to self- and other-objectification in girls.
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Most philosophical definitions of self--per Descartes, Locke, Hume, and William James are expressed in the first person. Ώ] A third person definition does not refer to specific mental qualia but instead strives for objectivity and operationalism.
To another person, the self of one individual is exhibited in the conduct and discourse of that individual. Therefore, the intentions of another individual can only be inferred from something that emanates from that individual. The particular characteristics of the self determine its identity.
Jack Angstreich Free Will Compatibilism Discussion
Nature of self, agency and free will debate. Akeel Bilgrami Compatibilism.